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Transforming Legal Education in Japan and Korea 
Tom Ginsburg∗ 
[Note: is a section of a longer work in progress; my talk will cover not only the 
educational apparatus but some aspects of changing legal profession in Japan and Korea.] 
 
Looking back to the 1980s, the image of Japan, Korea and the other Asian 
“Tigers” was very different than it was today.  The Japanese economy was soon going to 
surpass that of the United States, and Japanese companies were buying Pebble Beach, 
Rockefeller Center and other trophy properties. Popular books warned of the Japanese 
threat and counseled Americans on how to cope with “Japan as Number One.”1  Other 
Asian countries were close behind.2  East Asia was seen to have developed an alternative 
model of capitalism, based on an activist “developmental state” rather than the free 
market orthodoxy of Anglo-American capitalism.3 This model was seen as exportable, 
perhaps even to the United States.   
One key feature of this model was that it seemed to be a system of capitalism 
without lawyers.  Bar passage in Northeast Asia was notoriously low, and practicing 
lawyers did not play the same prominent role in business and government as they do in 
the United States. Prominent commentators, including Derek Bok, then-President of 
Harvard University,  focused on the fact that there were about one twentieth the number 
of legal professionals in Japan per capita as in the United States, and called for us to 
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become “more like them.”4  If only our best graduates, Bok suggested, became engineers 
like the Japanese rather than lawyers, we would be better off.5   
What a difference a decade makes.  Some fifteen years later, the Japanese 
economy has been bouncing in and out of recession.  Professor Ezra Vogel, whose 1979 
book “Japan as Number One?” heralded the earlier era of Japanophilia, authored a new 
book entitled “Is Japan Still Number One?” and answered in the negative.6  Meanwhile, 
the Korean economy weathered a sudden and very severe economic crisis in the mid-
1990s, and had to be rescued by the International Monetary Fund.  Both countries’ 
economic models have been criticized as stagnant and corrupt, as analysts excoriate many 
of the very features they had celebrated a few years earlier.7  
As politicians and bureaucrats in Northeast Asia attempt to resolve their economic 
malaise, one of the most surprising elements is the idea that law is part of the solution for 
Japan and Korea.  Rather than focus on how the United States has too many lawyers, the 
issue today is how do the countries of Northeast Asia produce more lawyers. Legal 
education is at the center of the debate over the role of law in ordering society and the 
need to revitalize economic institutions.  In both Japan and Korea, there have been 
proposals to develop three-year graduate, legal education for the first time. Sometimes 
called AAmerican@-style legal education, the new, controversial model has made inroads 
in both countries, a rare development in any country outside the Anglo-American 
tradition.   
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This story of the introduction of the graduate legal educational apparatus into 
Northeast Asia is an example of importing legal institutions from outside, and provides a 
comparative context to understand the conditions under which such transplants will 
survive and thrive.  This comment will first address the status quo ante by describing the 
traditional system of legal education in Japan and Korea, then talk about the new 
proposals for reform, and finally speculate as to where recent developments might lead. 
The status quo ante was of course more complex than the simple imagery of 
“capitalism without lawyers” suggested.  Although Japanese and Korean capitalism may 
have functioned with a relatively small number of lawyers, legal education was 
absolutely central to the systems of governance.  As in virtually the entire world, legal 
education was primarily an undergraduate phenomenon, and followed the German 
conception of legal education serving as a pathway to the bureaucracy and to big business 
as well as to distinctively legal professions.  Legal education was high status, generalist 
training, rather than specialized graduate, professional, legal education designed to 
produce practicing lawyers.  At the center of the Japanese system was the undergraduate 
law faculty at Tokyo University, which produced the majority of elite bureaucrats as well 
as leaders in law, finance, and business.8  Seoul National University played a similar role 
in Korea. 
In both countries, the bar exam was treated as a separate goal for a very small 
proportion of those who completed undergraduate legal education.  Relatively few legal 
graduates would try to pass the bar, and a very small proportion would actually succeed.  
The bar pass rates fluctuated between two and three percent in Japan and Korea for most 
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of the postwar period.9  Most bar passers devoted additional years of study to the process 
beyond the undergraduate degree. 
For those lucky and talented few who passed, the bar exam was the gateway to 
rather than the end-point of professional legal training.  Special institutions run by the 
Supreme Courts in both countries, called the Judicial Research and Training Institute 
(JRTI) in Korea and the Legal Training and Research Institute (LTRI) in Japan, would 
take all the bar passers and train them for two-year period together.10  Prosecutors, 
judges, and practicing lawyers would be trained together, socialized together, and then 
distributed out into the work force in their respective fields.  (Note also that they are 
technically civil servants who are paid.) In sum, legal education was divided really into 
three different components B undergraduate legal education, a series of Acram@ schools 
which would prepare one to pass the bar, and finally a special professionalized legal 
education, which came after bar passage and served as the only real practical training one 
would receive before entry into the various legal professions.   
In Japan, the exam to enter the LTRI was administered by a committee consisting 
of a Justice Ministry official, Secretary General of the Supreme Court and a practicing 
attorney recommended by the federation of bar associations (Nichibenren).    In Korea, 
the exam was similarly controlled by the Supreme Court.  Exam passage was kept at 500 
persons a year in Japan and 300 in Korea.  In Japan, the nominal reason was limitations 
on the capacity of the LTRI building.  In fact, the number was kept very small 
intentionally, through a consensus among the government, courts and, of course the 
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practicing bar, which preferred to collect monopoly rents from a restricted profession.  
Once admitted to the Training Institutes, prospective lawyers undertake a combination of 
classroom and practical training, during which time an individual might work in all three 
“branches” of the legal profession: the bar, the court and the prosecutors’ office.  This 
tended to facilitate a corporate identity among the three sub-professions.11 
There were many implications of this model of restricted access to the legal 
profession.  It was very difficult to obtain legal services in both countries, and much of 
the supposed non-litigiousness of people in each society can be attributed to the lack of 
the ability to find a lawyer if one was needed.12  Furthermore, most lawyers were 
concentrated in the big cities, and many people criticized the quality of legal 
professionals.  Beginning in the late 1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, pressure 
developed to change this system.  The pressure came from several sources: the Ministry 
of Justice and Supreme Court in Japan wanted to increase the number of prosecutors and 
judges, and big business began to complain about the lack of capacity in the legal system.   
As the economy declined, more disputes emerged, at the same time that deregulation was 
decreasing government control over the economy.  When business is embedded in a 
network of dense relationships with its workforce, buyers, suppliers and creditors, 
disputes can be suppressed or dealt with informally. The shrinking pie (or at least less 
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rapidly expanding pie) may have frayed such “social” ties and led to more disputes.  In 
Korea, democratization beginning in 1987 also contributed to the explosion of civil and 
administrative litigation.13  All of these developments reflected a sense that the 
institutions that had promoted high growth were no longer able to function in the era of 
economic decline, and trust in the government as a kind of steward of the economy 
disappeared.  
The first step in meeting new demands was an expansion in the number of bar 
passers.  Beginning in the early 1990s, both countries gradually expanded the number of 
passers to the current levels of over 1000 bar passers a year.  (See Table 1 in the 
Appendix).  Nevertheless, the approach is still one of setting a quota and allowing only 
the top exam takers up to a certain number to pass.  Passage is not a matter of setting a 
bar or a standard which anyone can meet.   
The first proposal to adopt an American style, three-year graduate law school 
emerged in 1995 in Korea in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Promotion 
of Globalization. The proposal was embedded in a broader program of judicial reform, 
but it was the law school element that emerged as the most controversial.14 Opponents 
seized on the “American-style” nature of the institution, and sought to block the proposal. 
In Japan, the proposal emerged later but the momentum developed rather quickly.  
A consensus on the need to expand the capacity of the legal system to handle civil 
litigation had been gradually developing in the 1990s, but a key juncture for legal 
education was the convening of a Justice System Reform Council by legislation in June 
1999, constituted under the Cabinet a month later. After two years of deliberations, the 
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Justice System Reform Council was released on June 12, 2001.15   The declared aim of 
the Council is nothing less than an overhaul of the justice system and the increased resort 
to law as a means of social ordering in Japan.  Specific goals include the establishment of 
new systems to process certain cases, such as labor, IP and family cases; expanding civil 
execution; lower fees; adoption of  a “loser-pays” rule; revision of the Administrative 
Case Litigation Law, whose narrow approach to standing and justiciability restricts 
effective judicial control of administration; establishment of a public defender system and 
other systems to improve pretrial detention; and development of victims’ rights. The 
report includes calls for an expansion in the number of judges and prosecutors as part of a 
transition towards a “law-governed society.” The report also explicitly seeks to loosen 
political and administrative control and move from “ex ante/planning” toward what the 
report characterizes as an “ex post review/remedy” society. 
Especially noteworthy for our purposes is reform of the legal training system, 
with a call for “law schools” to be adopted to better train legal professionals.16  Even 
before the final report called for graduate law schools, law faculties had begun to develop 
plans, and momentum developed rapidly for inclusion of the plan in the final report of the 
Council. A general concept of a new law school quickly steamrolled into a massive effort 
by private actors, virtually forcing the Council to push for realization of the plan.  
Legislation passed the Diet in December 2002, existing law faculties submitted plans for 
the new law schools to the Ministry of Education in July 2003, and charters are to be 
granted in November 2003.  The law schools will open their doors in April 2004.    
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Interestingly, although Korea was the source of the idea of having graduate legal 
education, the plans ran into political difficulty in Korea.  The primary reason was that 
the Korean bar was better situated than the Japanese bar to fight the proposal.  In 
particular, the head of the main opposition party, Lee Hoi Chang, was a former Supreme 
Court justice who opposed the proposal very vigorously.  Judges were also opposed to it 
because the judiciary has traditionally been seen as a point of entry into the private bar in 
Korea, in contrast with Japan.  Japanese judges saw an expanded bar as an opportunity to 
expand the number of judges, whereas Korean judges saw it as a threat to their ability to 
retire into lucrative private sector positions. Since judges control the current system of 
legal training, their assent to the new plan would be crucial for its passage.  In short, the 
constituency for adopting new law schools did not coalesce in Korea as it did in Japan.   
While the initial proposal was stillborn in Korea, the idea of graduate law schools 
remains in play. Under President Kim Dae Jung, the proposal resurfaced as part of an 
overhaul of the education system, but official standards for the schools have not yet been 
adopted.  At least one Korean university has set up, on its own, a three-year graduate 
legal education program with substantial English language instruction, even though it is 
not completely clear how this will interface with the bar and what the graduates will do.17  
According to some involved in the process, the goal is to establish Korean lawyers as 
legal professionals who can serve clients all over Asia, so it really is a sort of effort at 
globalization by Korean educators despite the fact that the government has been slower to 
approve their plans. 
While it is still unclear exactly what the shape of graduate legal education will be 
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in Korea and Japan, the debate over legal education reflects the perceived need by the 
legal professions in both countries, to globalize, to expand, and to upgrade their 
professional skills for a new, more competitive, economy. Whether or not the new 
systems will effective in meeting their goals, of course, is unclear.  In my view, as long as 
there is kind of quota system or a quota approach to the legal profession, there is going to 
be great pressure on legal education of whatever form to serve primarily as a kind of bar 
preparation course, rather than truly professional education emphasizing skills.  The 
quota system acts as an artificial source of scarcity in the market for legal services, and 
even the most talented applicants have an incentive to focus on passing the exam rather 
than acquiring skills.  Interestingly, the continued presence of the post-bar legal training 
institutes, no doubt necessary as a political compromise to ensure the passage of law 
school reform proposals, means that the law school will not be the primary site of skills 
acquisition in any case.  
------- 
How should we best explain the shift toward graduate legal education in Japan 
and Korea?  A number of hypotheses suggest themselves, and will be considered in 
sequence.  As a general trope, we might consider Dezalay and Garth’s 
“internationalization of the palace wars” metaphor, which reminds us that the boundaries 
of the nation-state are not necessarily the right line to focus on in stories of institutional 
transformation.  Insiders and outsiders position themselves, form coalitions, and seek to 
advance their interests in a complex story. 
First, one might tell a “globalization” story of institutional transfer from the 
United States, either through a type of direct imposition or, more plausibly, through a 
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competitive dynamic.  While the presence of economic crisis in Japan and especially 
Korea was the impetus behind accelerating the shift toward legal ordering, a general 
globalization framework seems insufficient at best to explain the phenomenon.  No 
American institution has sought to export the U.S. model  of legal education directly to 
Japan or Korea. Although American business schools have been gradually expanding into 
Asia educational markets, there has been very limited such movement in law (perhaps the 
only example being a program by Northwestern University held in Korea each year.)   
Indeed, ABA accreditation requirements severely hamper such movement by law 
schools.  It can hardly be said that local institutions sought to compete with American 
graduate education in the region.   
One might also suggest that educational institutions would seek to compete for 
market share, and perhaps keep the best law graduates at home for advanced training 
rather than lose them to LLM programs in the metropole.  While this may in fact have 
been the motive for particular educational institutions, the relatively late development of 
the issue on the part of universities in the Japanese case seems to indicate this was a 
secondary rather than primary cause.  Furthermore, a globalization story would suggest 
greater convergence around the globe.  Few, if any, other jurisdictions have considered 
adoption of the graduate model, yet one would expect there would be some jurisdictions 
that would were there any competitive advantage to doing so. 
Indeed, the literature on the globalization of the progressions suggests the process 
has been somewhat slower in law than one might have expected, given the central role 
expansion in services trade has played as a goal of U.S. trade policy in recent decades.  
Local practice requirements remain firmly in place, to a far greater extent than in other 
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professions.18 
 
If educational institutions were not the driving force, what of the legal profession? 
Obviously there is an intimate relationship between the educational apparatus and the 
profession, and educational credentials serve an important regulatory role.19  Educational 
institutions help ensure quality, socialize participants, and impart particular skills..  In 
doing so, they help raise the status of the profession as a whole. 
Professional lawyers in Japan and Korea historically have had very limited 
control over the training apparatus.  With the Supreme Court firmly in charge of the 
content, and the trainees on the public payroll, production of lawyers was simultaneously 
limited and subsidized.  Firms could not recruit, preventing market timing problems that 
have been observed in the American context.20   Yet the professions were not initially 
lobbying for opening up these processes.  Nichibenren in Japan was the legal actor that 
longest resisted bar expansion, and only engaged in legal education when it appeared to 
be a fait accompli.  As with the educational institutions, we see an actor that sought to 
position itself for control and advantage in the new game, once it became clear that the 
game was being played.  Korean lawyers, by contrast, successfully resisted the changes, 
due to their superior positioning, and the presence of key allies on the bench.   
Indeed, bench-bar relations emerges as the key factor explaining differential 
success of the educational proposals in Japan and Korea.  In Japan, an autonomous 
judiciary interested initially in expanding the bench was the first source of pressure for 
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bar expansion.  In Korea, the bench is relatively less autonomous in some sense, because 
of the practice of judicial retirement into the bar.  This gave judges a direct incentive to 
combat expansion of the profession in general, to go along with their monopolistic 
incentive to retain control of the training scheme.  This analysis points to the value of  
localized political analysis; operating at the level of professional discourse does not 
illuminate the particulars of this story. 
----- 
The mid-1990s reform proposals in Japan and Korea called for nothing less than a 
complete overhaul of the systems of legal education and training.  Nominally “American” 
in style, the proposals were indigenously produced and reflected borrowing rather than 
imposition.  They should be understood as reflecting local politics, as demonstrated by 
the different fates of law school proposals in Japan and Korea. Japan is moving headlong 
into an ill-defined transformation, while the Korean proposal remains in limbo.  The 
shifting focus of legal education in Japan toward training professionals rather than 
generalists for the bureaucracy and business heralds a broader social transformation in 
which lawyers are likely to be leading figures.21  This transformation bears close 
watching in years ahead.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.  Korean Judicial Examination Statistics (1949-1980) 
Year Applicants Those Who Passed Rate of Success 
1949 625 16  2.5% 
1951 457 39 8.1 
1952 258 21 8.5 
1953 711 16 2.3 
1953 842 12 1.4 
1954 1,141 17 1.4 
1955 1,999 30 1.5 
1956 2,855 108 3.7 
1957 3,414 51 1.4 
1958 3,047 50 1.6 
1959 3,416 24 0.7 
1960 5,557 31 0.5 
1961 4,450 110 2.4 
1962 3,036 50 1.6 
1962 3,825 56 1.4 
1963 3,194 36 1.1 
1963 3,450 41 1.2 
1963 2,318 45 1.9 
1964 3,770 10 0.3 
1964 3,251 22 0.7 
1965 2,141 16 0.7 
1966 1,858 19 1.0 
1967 2,304 5 0.2 
1967 1,837 83 4.5 
1968 2,070 37 1.8 
1969 2,363 34 1.4 
1970 2,326 33 1.4 
1970 2,531 49 1.9 
1971 2,629 81 3.1 
1972 3,215 80 2.5 
1973 3,614 60 1.7 
1974 3,311 60 1.8 
1975 3,344 59 1.7 
1976 3,625 60 1.7 
1977 4,011 80 2.0 
1978 4,153 100 2.4 
1979 4.506 120 2.7 
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1980  141  
Total 101,454 1,902 1.7 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Korean Judicial Examination Statistics (1981-2002) 
 
Year Applicants Those Who Passed Rate of Success 
1981 6,173 289  4.7% 
1982 7,386 300 4.1 
1983 8,450 300 3.6 
1984 12,221 303 2.5 
1985 12,449 298 2.4 
1986 14,303 300 2.1 
1987 14,963 300 2.0 
1988 14,245 300 2.1 
1989 14,201 300 2.1 
1990 15,041 298 2.0 
1991 16,311 287 1.8 
1992 17,131 288 1.7 
1993 18,991 288 1.5 
1994 19,736 290 1.5 
1995 20,737 308 1.5 
1996 22,771 502 2.2 
1997 20,551 604 2.9 
1998 20,755 700 3.4 
1999 22,964 709 3.1 
2000 23,249 801 3.4 
2001 22,365 991 4.4 
2002 30,024 999 3.3 
Total 375,017 9,755 2.65 
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Table 3: Japan Judicial Examination Statistics 1988-2001 
 
 
Year Applicants Passers Rate  
1988 23,352 512 2.19 
1989 23,202 506 2.18 
1990 22,900 499 2.18 
1991 22,596 605 2.68 
1992 23,435 630 2.69 
1993 20,848 712 3.42 
1994 22,554 740 3.28 
1995 24,488 738 3.01 
1996 25,454 734 2.88 
1997 27,112 746 2.75 
1998 30,568 812 2.66 
1999 33,983 1,000 2.94 
2000 36,203 994 2.75 
2001 38,930 990 2.54 
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Table 4. Korean  Legal Professionals: Change by Year 
 
Year Population Judge Pros. Atty Total Pop.per Legal Pro. 
1971 32,139,000 387 350 748 1,485 21,642 
1972 33,505,000 415 360 745 1,520 22,043 
1973 34,103,000 438 372 785 1,595 21,400 
1974 34,692,000 460 378 812 1,650 21,025 
1975 35,281,000 477 398 809 1,684 20,950 
1976 35,860,000 482 396 819 1,697 21,131 
1977 36,436,000 496 424 811 1,731 21,049 
1978 37,019,000 546 436 832 1,814 20,407 
1979 37,354,000 502 446 890 1,838 20,323 
1980 37,448,000 536 437 940 1,913 19,575 
1981 38,693,000 571 409 1,013 1,993 19,414 
1986 41,568,000 837 557 1,483 2,877 14,448 
1990 42,869,000 1,124 787 2,742 4,653 9,213 
1995 45,093,000 1,374 987 3,731 6,092 7,402 
1999 46,617,000 1,644 1,207 4,338 7,189 6,484 
2000 47,008,000 1,724 1,287 4,699 7,710 6,097 
2001 47,343,000 1,738 1,287 5,136 8,161 5,801 
2002 47,640,000 1,842 1,444 5,595 8,881 5,364 
2003 47,925,000 1,912 1,514 5,915 9,341 5,131 
 
 
